Blumer's three stages
The growth of the self in the child, Mead points out, passes through three
stages. The first stage, appearing usually during the second year of the
child's life, is marked by meaningless imitative acts. The small child who
has seen its parents read newspapers may hold a newspaper before it and
move its head from side to side. It does not get the meaning of this act;
the newspaper may be upside down, and besides, the child cannot read
anyway. However, this otherwise useless imitative behavior is significant-
it implies that the child is beginning to take the roles of those around
it, that is, to put itself in the position of others and to act like them.
In the second stage-the play stage, which appears later in childhood-this
role-taking becomes very evident, and, furthermore, it becomes meaningful.
We are familiar with the behavior of children as they engage in play-
acting-"playing mother," "playing nurse," "playing teacher," "playing
janitor," and so forth. Here the child puts itself in the role of the given
person and acts in accordance with the part. What is of central importance
to such play-acting is that it places the child in the position where it is
able to act back toward itself. Thus, in "playing mother" the child can act
toward itself in ways in which its mother is accustomed to act toward it.
The child may talk to itself as the mother does, addressing itself by its
proper name and making commands to itself. It is apparently in this play
stage that the child first begins to form a self, that is, to direct social
activity toward itself; and it is important to note that it does so by
taking the parts or roles of other people. This latter point has great
significance, because it means that the particular ways in which it does
act toward itself are set by the customary actions of those whose roles the
child takes. A more vivid way of stating [p. 182] the point is to say that
the child views itself in terms of the way in which it is viewed by those
whose roles it takes; its conception of itself is formed out of the way in
which it is regarded by others. We shall have occasion to stress this point
again shortly.
In the play state, strictly speaking, the child forms a number of separate
and discrete objects of itself, depending on the different roles from which
it acts towards itself. This is shown in the fickleness and inconsistency
with which we are familiar in the case of small children, as contrasted
with the consistency of adults. This sets the problem of how a unified self
is established -a self which remains more or less constant from one
situation to another. Mead explains that the development of a unified self,
a conception of oneself that remains the same, is a result of experience
such as is had iii participating in games. In the game situation, the
participant has to take the roles of a number of people simultaneously. We
may illustrate this with the game of baseball. On a given play, a player
expects each of the other members on the team to carry out a given action.
In adjusting himself he anticipates what each is going to do. In this sense
he takes a number of roles in his imagination at the same time.
Mead points out further that this role-taking ability, as it is developed
in the game situation, permits the individual to take the role of the
group, that is, what is common to a number of different individuals. He
speaks of this as taking the role of the "generalized other." One may then
act toward oneself from the position of the "generalized other," and
consequently guide one's actions in terms of the expectations of this
generalized other. One does this, for example, when he governs his conduct
by some moral conception or maxim. He is really talking to himself and
[183] acting toward himself from the standpoint of the generalized other,
which can be thought of as representing the group. A young man may seek to
act in all situations like a gentleman; accordingly, he governs his conduct
from the standpoint of this role, reminding himself, urging himself,
cautioning himself, as the case may be, in accordance with the demands and
expectations of this role. It should be clear that in taking a generalized
role, the individual is able to stabilize his conduct, that is to say, keep
it essentially consistent from situation to situation. Correspondingly, in
response to such a generalized role, the individual is able to integrate
his attitudes or to develop an organized self.
It has been indicated that the individual derives his conception of himself
largely from the way in which he is conceived by others. This point shows,
especially, how closely our personalities are formed by the kind of
positions which we occupy in our various groups. Toward each social
position (teacher, dean, graduate student, minister, mother, doctor, and so
forth) people have certain common attitudes; they expect a certain kind of
conduct and behavior from people in these status-positions. Consequently,
one who occupies such a position is aware of these expectations and is
cognizant of the way in which he is viewed by people because he does have
such a, status. To maintain this position his conduct must conform to these
,expectations, and it is inevitable that he views himself largely in accord
with the public attitude toward his role. In this way his conception of
himself reflects the attitudes of others and the social organization that
is sustained by these attitudes.
What is implied by this treatment is that the individual undergoes a change
in personality as he develops a new [184] conception of himself. Viewing
himself differently, he places new expectations on his conduct and guides
this conduct by these new rules or demands. To have a new conception of
oneself means, in accordance with Mead's view, that the individual has a
new generalized other, which, in turn, is to be recognized as representing
a common or abstract group role. Tracing backward this relationship, one
may say that an individual changes his personality by getting a new social
position; in this new status, he becomes cognizant of the new way in which
he is viewed by society; a generalized other is formed corresponding to
these views and expectations held by the group; the presence of this
generalized other means that he has a new conception of himself, and his
conduct and tendencies to action are organized in accordance with this
conception of himself.
From what has been said, one can see the intimate way in which the
personalities of people are connected with the nature of social life in
their respective groups. Whether personality be viewed in the formal way
proposed by the stimulus-response adherents, or in the more subtle manner
suggested by the symbolic interactionists, it shows clearly the impression
of group life. Since it represents patterns of action which have developed
under the influence, guidance, and pressure of one's associates, it can be
recognized as being genuinely social.