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Time Line 1651
Social Science History on Hobbes, Filmer and Locke Introduction and Contents |
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Leviathan
The Matter, Form and Power of a CommonwealthEcclesiastical and Civil
By Thomas Hobbes, Published April 1651
Chapter 4: Of Speech
(¶) Paragraph numbers added to assist referencing
[Margin: Original of Speech]
(¶ 4.1) The invention of
printing, though ingenious, compared
with the
invention of letters is no great matter. But who was the first that
found the use of letters is not known. He that first brought them into
Greece, men say, was
Cadmus, the son of Agenor, King of Phoenicia. A
profitable invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the
conjunction of mankind dispersed into so many and distant regions of the
earth; and withal difficult, as proceeding from a watchful observation of
the diverse motions of the tongue, palate, lips, and other organs of
speech; whereby to make as many differences of characters to remember them.
But the most noble and profitable invention of all other was that of
SPEECH, consisting of names or appellations, and their
connexion; whereby men register their thoughts, recall them when they are
past, and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and
conversation; without which there had been amongst men neither
Commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst
lions, bears, and wolves. The first author of speech was
God himself, that
instructed
Adam how to name such creatures as He presented to his sight;
for the
Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was
sufficient
to direct him to add more names, as the experience and use of the creatures
should give him occasion; and to join them in such manner by degrees as to
make himself understood; and so by succession of time, so much language
might be gotten as he had found use for, though not so copious as an orator
or philosopher has need of. For I do not find anything in the Scripture out
of which, directly or by consequence, can be gathered that Adam was taught
the names of all figures, numbers, measures, colours, sounds, fancies,
relations; much less the names of words and speech, as general, special,
affirmative, negative, interrogative, optative, infinitive, all which are
useful; and least of all, of entity, intentionality, quiddity, and other
insignificant words of the school.
(¶ 4.2) But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his
posterity,
was again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God every man was
stricken for his rebellion with an oblivion of his former language. And
being hereby forced to disperse themselves into several parts of the world,
it must needs be that the diversity of tongues that now is, proceeded by
degrees from them in such manner as need, the mother of all inventions,
taught them, and in tract of time grew everywhere more copious.
Margin:
[Margin: The use of speech]
(¶ 4.3) The general use of speech is to transfer our mental
discourse into
verbal, or the train of our thoughts into a train of words, and that for
two commodities; whereof one is the registering of the consequences of our
thoughts, which being apt to slip out of our memory and put us to a new
labour, may again be recalled by such words as they were marked by. So that
the first use of names is to serve for marks or notes of remembrance.
Another is when many use the same words to signify, by their connexion and
order one to another, what they conceive or think of each matter; and also
what they desire, fear, or have any other passion for. And for this use
they are called signs. Special uses of speech are these: first, to register
what by cogitation we find to be the cause of anything, present or past;
and what we find things present or past may produce, or effect; which, in
sum, is acquiring of arts. Secondly, to show to others that knowledge which
we have attained; which is to counsel and teach one another. Thirdly, to
make known to others our wills and purposes that we may have the mutual
help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight ourselves, and others,
by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.
[Margin: Abuses of Speech]
(¶ 4.4) To these uses, there are also four correspondent abuses.
First, when
men register their thoughts wrong by the inconstancy of the signification
of their words; by which they register for their conceptions that which
they never conceived, and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use
words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained
for, and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that
to be their will which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one
another: for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth,
some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an
abuse of speech to grieve him with the tongue, unless it be one whom we are
obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.
(¶ 4.5) The manner how speech serveth to the remembrance of the
consequence of
causes and effects consisteth in the imposing of names, and the connexion
of them.
[Margin: Names proper and common]
(¶ 4.6) Of names, some are proper, and singular to one only thing;
as Peter,
John, this man, this tree: and some are common to many things; as man,
horse, tree; every of which, though but one name, is nevertheless the name
of diverse particular things; in respect of all which together, it is
called a
[Margin: Universal]
universal, there being nothing in the world universal but names;
for the things named are every one of them individual and singular.
(¶ 4.7) One universal name is imposed on many things for their
similitude in
some quality, or other accident: and whereas a proper name bringeth to mind
one thing only, universals recall any one of those many.
(¶ 4.8) And of names universal, some are of more and some of less
extent, the
larger comprehending the less large; and some again of equal extent,
comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the name body is of
larger signification than the word man, and comprehendeth it; and the names
man and rational are of equal extent, comprehending mutually one another.
But here we must take notice that by a name is not always understood, as in
grammar, one only word, but sometimes by circumlocution many words
together. For all these words, He that in his actions observeth the laws of
his country, make but one name, equivalent to this one word, just.
(¶ 4.9) By this imposition of names, some of larger, some of
stricter
signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined
in the mind into a reckoning of the consequences of appellations. For
example, a man that hath no use of speech at all, (such as is born and
remains perfectly deaf and dumb), if he set before his eyes a triangle, and
by it two right angles (such as are the corners of a square figure), he may
by meditation compare and find that the three angles of that triangle are
equal to those two right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle
be shown him different in shape from the former, he cannot know without a
new labour whether the three angles of that also be equal to the same. But
he that hath the use of words, when he observes that such equality was
consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular
thing in his triangle; but only to this, that the sides were straight, and
the angles three, and that that was all, for which he named it a triangle;
will boldly conclude universally that such equality of angles is in all
triangles whatsoever, and register his invention in these general terms:
Every triangle hath its three angles equal to two right angles. And thus
the consequence found in one particular comes to be registered and
remembered as a universal rule; and discharges our mental reckoning of time
and place, and delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first;
and makes that which was found true here, and now, to be true in all times
and places.
(¶ 4.10) But the use of words in registering our thoughts is in
nothing so
evident as in numbering. A natural fool that could never learn by heart the
order of numeral words, as one, two, and three, may observe every stroke of
the clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one, but can never know what
hour it strikes. And it seems there was a time when those names of number
were not in use; and men were fain to apply their fingers of one or both
hands to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence it
proceeded that now our numeral words are but ten, in any nation, and in
some but five, and then they begin again. And he that can tell ten, if he
recite them out of order, will lose himself, and not know when he has done:
much less will he be able to add, and subtract, and perform all other
operations of arithmetic. So that without words there is no possibility of
reckoning of numbers; much less of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and
other things, the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being or
well-being of mankind.
(¶ 4.11) When two names are joined together into a consequence, or
affirmation,
as thus, A man is a living creature; or thus, If he be a man, he is a
living creature; if the latter name living creature signify all that the
former name man signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence, is true;
otherwise false. For true and false are attributes of speech, not of
things. And where speech is not, there is neither truth nor falsehood.
Error there may be, as when we expect that which shall not be, or suspect
what has not been; but in neither case can a man be charged with untruth.
[Margin: Necessity of Definitions]
(¶ 4.12) Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of
names in our
affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth had need to remember what
every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly; or else he will
find himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime twigs; the more he
struggles, the more belimed. And therefore in geometry (which is the only
science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind), men begin
at settling the significations of their words; which settling of
significations, they call definitions, and place them in the beginning of
their reckoning.
(¶ 4.13) By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that
aspires to true
knowledge to examine the definitions of former authors; and either to
correct them, where they are negligently set down, or to make them himself.
For the errors of definitions multiply themselves, according as the
reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see,
but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in which lies
the foundation of their errors. From whence it happens that they which
trust to books do as they that cast up many little sums into a greater,
without considering whether those little sums were rightly cast up or not;
and at last finding the error visible, and not mistrusting their first
grounds, know not which way to clear themselves, spend time in fluttering
over their books; as birds that entering by the chimney, and finding
themselves enclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a glass
window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in. So that in the
right definition of names lies the first use of speech; which is the
acquisition of science: and in wrong, or no definitions, lies the first
abuse; from which proceed all false and senseless tenets; which make those
men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from
their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men as
men endued with true science are above it. For between true science and
erroneous doctrines, ignorance is in the middle. Natural sense and
imagination are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot err: and as
men abound in copiousness of language; so they become more wise, or more
mad, than ordinary. Nor is it possible without letters for any man to
become either excellently wise or (unless his memory be hurt by disease, or
ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For words are wise men's
counters; they do but reckon by them: but they are the money of fools, that
value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any
other doctor whatsoever, if but a man.
[Margin: Subject to Names]
(¶ 4.14) Subject to names is whatsoever can enter into or be
considered in an
account, and be added one to another to make a sum, or subtracted
one from another and leave a remainder. The Latins called accounts
of money rationes, and accounting, ratiocinatio: and that which we
in bills or books of account call items, they called nomina; that
is, names: and thence it seems to proceed that they extended the
word ratio to the faculty of reckoning in all other things. The Greeks
have but one word, logos, for both speech and reason; not that they
thought there was no speech without reason, but no reasoning without
speech; and the act of reasoning they called syllogism; which
signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to another.
And because the same things may enter into account for diverse
accidents, their names are (to show that diversity) diversely
wrested and diversified. This diversity of names may be reduced to
four general heads.
(¶ 4.15) First, a thing may enter into account for matter, or body;
as
living, sensible, rational, hot, cold, moved, quiet; with all which
names the word matter, or body, is understood; all such being names of
matter.
(¶ 4.16) Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for
some
accident or quality which we conceive to be in it; as for being moved,
for being so long, for being hot, etc.; and then, of the name of the
thing itself, by a little change or wresting, we make a name for
that accident which we consider; and for living put into the account
life; for moved, motion; for hot, heat; for long, length, and the
like: and all such names are the names of the accidents and properties
by which one matter and body is distinguished from another. These
are called names abstract, because severed, not from matter, but
from the account of matter.
(¶ 4.17) Thirdly, we bring into account the properties of our own
bodies,
whereby we make such distinction: as when anything is seen by us, we
reckon not the thing itself, but the sight, the colour, the idea of it
in the fancy; and when anything is heard, we reckon it not, but the
hearing or sound only, which is our fancy or conception of it by the
ear: and such are names of fancies.
(¶ 4.18) Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names,
to
names themselves, and to speeches: for, general, universal, special,
equivocal, are names of names. And affirmation, interrogation,
commandment, narration, syllogism, sermon, oration, and many other
such are names of speeches.
[Margin: Use of Names Positive]
And this is all the variety of names
positive; which are put to mark somewhat which is in nature, or may be
feigned by the mind of man, as bodies that are, or may be conceived to
be; or of bodies, the properties that are, or may be feigned to be; or
words and speech.
[Margin: Negative Names with their Uses]
(¶ 4.19) There be also other names, called negative; which are notes
to
signify that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these
words: nothing, no man, infinite, indocible, three want four, and
the like; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting
of reckoning, and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be
not names of anything; because they make us refuse to admit of names
not rightly used.
[Margin: Words insignificant]
(¶ 4.20) All other names are but insignificant sounds; and those of
two
sorts. One, when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained
by definition; whereof there have been abundance coined by Schoolmen
and puzzled philosophers.
(¶ 4.21) Another, when men make a name of two names, whose
significations are
contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an incorporeal body, or,
which is all one, an incorporeal substance, and a great number more.
For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it
is composed, put together and made one, signify nothing at all. For
example, if it be a false affirmation to say a quadrangle is round,
the word round quadrangle signifies nothing, but is a mere sound. So
likewise if it be false to say that virtue can be poured, or blown
up and down, the words inpoured virtue, inblown virtue, are as
absurd and insignificant as a round quadrangle. And therefore you
shall hardly meet with a senseless and insignificant word that is
not made up of some Latin or Greek names. Frenchman seldom hears our
Saviour called by the name of Parole, but by the name of Verbe
often; yet Verbe and Parole differ no more but that one is Latin,
the other French.
[Margin: Understanding]
(¶ 4.22) When a man, upon the hearing of any speech, hath those
thoughts
which the words of that speech, and their connexion, were ordained and
constituted to signify, then he is said to understand it:
understanding being nothing else but conception caused by speech.
And therefore if speech be peculiar to man, as for ought I know it is,
then is understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd
and false affirmations, in case they be universal, there can be no
understanding; though many think they understand then, when they do
but repeat the words softly, or con them in their mind.
(¶ 4.23) What kinds of speeches signify the appetites, aversions,
and
passions of man's mind, and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when
I have spoken of the passions.
[Margin: Inconstant names]
(¶ 4.24) The names of such things as affect us, that is, which
please and displease
us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same
man at all times, are in the common discourses of men of inconstant
signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signify our conceptions,
and all our affections are but conceptions; when we conceive the same
things differently, we can hardly avoid different naming of them. For
though the nature of that we conceive be the same; yet the diversity of our
reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body and
prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture of our different
passions. And therefore in reasoning, a man must take heed of words; which,
besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a
signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker;
such as are the names of virtues and vices: for one man calleth wisdom what
another calleth fear; and one cruelty what another justice; one prodigality
what another magnanimity; and one gravity what another stupidity, etc. And
therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No
more can metaphors and tropes of speech: but these are less dangerous
because they profess their inconstancy, which the other do not.
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