16. MIND AND THE SYMBOL
Starts page 117
---118---119---120---
The odor of the victim engages the attention of the beast of prey, and by
attention to that odor he does satisfy his hunger and insure his future.
What is the difference between such a situation and the conduct of the man
who acts, as we say, rationally? The fundamental difference is that the
latter individual in some way indicates this character, whatever it may be,
to another person and to himself; and the symbolization of it by means of
this indicative gesture is what constitutes the mechanism that gives the
implements, at least, for intelligent conduct. Thus, one points to a
certain footprint, and says that it means bear. Now to identify that sort
of a trace by means of some symbol so that it can be utilized by the
different members of the group, but particularly by the individual himself
later, is the characteristic thing about human intelligence. To be able to
identify "this as leading to that," and to get some sort of a gesture,
vocal or otherwise, which can be used to indicate the implication to others
and to himself so as to make possible the control of conduct with reference
to it, is the distinctive thing in human intelligence which is not found in
animal intelligence.
What such symbols do is to pick out particular characteristics of the
situation so that the response to them can be present in the experience of
the individual. We may say they are present in ideal form, as in a tendency
to run away, in a sinking of the stomach when we come on the fresh
footprints of a bear. The indication that this is a bear calls out the
response of avoiding the bear, or if one is on a bear hunt, it indicates
the further progress of the hunt. One gets the response into experience
before that response is overtly carried out through indicating and
emphasizing the stimulus that instigates it. When this symbol is utilized
for the thing itself one is, in Watson's terms, conditioning a reflex. The
sight of the bear would lead one to run away, the footprint conditioned
that reflex, and the word "bear" spoken by one's self or a friend can also
condition the reflex, so (p.121) that the sign comes to stand for the thing
so far
as action is concerned.
What I have been trying to bring out is the difference between the
foregoing type of conduct and the type which I have illustrated by the
experiment on the baby with the
white rat and the noise behind its head. In
the latter situation there is a conditioning of the reflex in which there
is no holding apart of the different elements. But when there is a
conditioning of the reflex which involves the word "bear," or the sight of
the footprint, there is in the experience of the individual the separation
of the stimulus and the response. Here the symbol means bear, and that in
turn means getting out of the way, or furthering the hunt. Under those
circumstances the person who stumbles on the footprints of the bear is not
afraid of the footprints-he is afraid of the bear. The footprint means a
bear. The child is afraid of the rat, so that the response of fear is to
the sight of the white rat; the man is not afraid of the footprint, but of
the bear. The footprint and the symbol which refers to the bear in some
sense may be said to condition or set off the response, but the bear and
not the sign is the object of the fear. The isolation of the symbol, as
such, enables one to hold on to these given characters and to isolate them
in their relationship to the object, and consequently in their relation to
the response. It is that, I think, which characterizes our human
intelligence to a peculiar degree. We have a set of symbols by means of
which we indicate certain characters, and in indicating those characters
hold them apart from their immediate environment, and keep simply one
relationship clear. We isolate the footprint of the bear and keep only that
relationship to the animal that made it. We are reacting to that, nothing
else. One holds on to it as an indication of the bear and of the value that
object has in experience as something to be avoided or to be hunted. The
ability to isolate these important characters in their relationship to the
object and to the response which belongs to the object is, I think, what we
generally mean when we speak of a human being thinking a thing out, or
having a mind. Such ability makes (p.122) the world-wide difference between
the
conditioning of reflexes in the case of the white rat and the human process
of thinking by means of symbols.[2]
Footnote 2: The meanings of things or objects are actual inherent
properties or qualities of them, the locus of any given meaning is in the
thing which, as we say, "has it." We refer to the meaning of a thing when
we make use of the symbol. Symbols stand for the meanings of those things
or objects which have meanings; they are given portions of experience which
point to, indicate, or represent other portions of experience not directly
present or given at the time when, and in the situation in which, any one
of them is thus present (or is immediately experienced). The symbol is thus
more than a mere substitute stimulus -- more than a mere stimulus for a
conditioned response or reflex. For the conditioned reflex-the response to
a mere substitute stimulus -- does not or need not involve consciousness;
whereas the response to a symbol does and must involve consciousness.
Conditioned reflexes plus consciousness of the attitudes and meanings they
involve are what constitute language, and hence lay the basis, or comprise
the mechanism for, thought and intelligent conduct. language is the means
whereby individuals can indicate to one another what their responses to
objects will be, and hence what the meanings of objects are; it is not a
mere system of conditioned reflexes. Rational conduct always involves a
reflexive reference to self, that is, an indication to the individual of
the significances which his actions or gestures have for other individuals.
And the experiential or behavioristic basis for such conduct-the neuro-
physiological mechanism of thinking-is to be found, as we have seen, in the
central nervous system.
...122...123...124
in the case of the lower animals... we do not find in any animal behaviour
that we can work out in detail any symbol, any method of communication,
anything that will answer to these different responses so that they can all
be held there in the experience of the individual. It is that which
differentiates the action of the reflectively intelligent being from the
conduct of the
lower forms; and the mechanism that makes that possible is
language. We have to recognize that language is a part of conduct. Mind
involves, however, a relationship to the characters of things. Those
characters are in the things, (125) and while the stimuli call out the
response which is in one sense present in the organism, the responses are
to things out there. The whole process is not a mental product and you
cannot put it inside of the brain. Mentality is that relationship of the
organism to the situation which is mediated by sets of symbols.
18. THE
SELF AND THE
ORGANISM
Starts page 135
...
par. 18.1]
the language process is essential for the development of the self. The self
has a character which is different from that of the physiological organism
proper. The self is something which has a development; it is not initially
there, at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and
activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his
relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that
process. The intelligence of the
lower forms of animal life, like a great
deal of human intelligence, does not involve a self.
...
One must... distinguish between the
experience that immediately takes place and our own organisation of it into
the experience of the self.
...
We do so intimately identify our
experiences... with the self that it
takes a moment... to realize that pain and pleasure can be there
without being the experience of the self.
Similarly, we normally organise
our memories upon the string of our self. If we date things we always date
them from the point of view of our past experiences. We frequently have
memories that we cannot date, that we cannot place. A picture comes before
us suddenly
and we are at a loss to explain when that experience originally took place.
We remember perfectly distinctly the picture, but we do not have it
definitely placed, and until we can place it in terms of our past
experience we are not satisfied.
...
par. 18.2]
We can distinguish very definitely between the self and the body. The body
can be there and can operate in a very intelligent fashion without there
being a self involved in the experience.
The self has the characteristic
that it is an object to itself, and that characteristic distinguishes it
from other objects and from the body.
It is perfectly true that the eye can
see the foot, but it does not see the body as a whole. We cannot see our
backs; we can feel certain portions of them, if we are agile, but we cannot
get an experience of our whole body...
... the bodily
experiences are for us organised about a self. The foot and hand belong to
the self.
...
The parts of the body are quite distinguishable
from the self. We can lose parts of the body without any serious invasion
of the self...
par. 18.3]
It is the characteristic of the self as an object to itself that I want to
bring out. This characteristic is represented in the word "self," which is
a
reflexive, and indicates that which can
be both subject and object.